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Not all the criticism of the United States Supreme Court
is unjostified as readers of the follo iling article will agree.
SUPREME COURT USE
OF NON-LEGAL MATERIALS
REYNOLDS C. SEITZ*
THE THOUGHT PROCESSES and ingredients that go into appellate court
decision-making have consistently been of interest to many students of
the law. Judges have thoughtfully pondered the many problems involved.
One of the greatest jurists, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo,' in 1921
presented his thinking in a lecture which is widely recognized today as
a true legal classic. Under the appropriate heading "Nature of the
Judicial Process,"'2 Cardozo undertook to answer these specific questions:
What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what sources of information
do I appeal for guidance? In what proportions do I permit them to contribute
to the result? In what proportions ought they to contribute? If a precedent
is applicable, when do I refuse to follow it? If no precedent is applicable,
how do I reach the rule that will make a precedent for the future? If I am
seeking logical consistency, the symmetry of the legal structure, how far
shall I seek it? At what point shall the quest be halted by some discrepant
custom, by some consideration of the social welfare, by my own or the
common standards of justice and morals?3
The answers which Cardozo gave are, of course, not known to the
average citizen. Indeed, many lawyers may not have been exposed
sufficiently to them; or, if attorneys have studied and remembered the
lectures, many find difficult the application of the scholarly jurispru-
dential reasoning to specific fact situations.
At any rate, appellate court decisions of major importance continue to
foster queries bearing upon the nature of the judicial process. Most partic-
ularly, a departure from precedent in connection with a holding which has
far-reaching social and economic consequences causes both the layman
and the lawyer to think about the standards which a judge uses in coming
to a conclusion upon a point of law.
*B.A. (1929), Notre Dame University; M.A. (1932), Northwestern University;
LL.B. (1935), Creighton University. Dean of the Law School of Marquette Univer-
sity.
1 At one time Judge of the New York Court of Appeals and later an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States.
2 Copyrighted in 1921 by Yale University Press. Now appearing in many volumes.
3 See HALL, SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 109 (1947).
In modern times, the case which has
produced this effect to a startling degree is
Brown v. Board of Education.4 This is the
decision in which the United States Supreme
Court reversed Plessy v. Ferguson5 and its
"separate but equal" doctrine and held that
a state law ordering segregation in public
schools offended the "equal protection of
the laws" provision of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. The
Supreme Court stated that segregation in
the public schools has a detrimental psycho-
logical effect upon the negro child and
interferes with the learning process. This
conclusion, deduced as it is from several
volumes6 on psychology and sociology
which were not presented in the briefs of
attorneys, was the particular spark which
aroused again wide-spread interest in the
judicial process.
The nation's press has played a major
role in acquainting the public with the issue.
Comment by way of challenge has ranged
from criticism by named columnists accus-
ing the Court of relying upon rank propa-
ganda disseminated by ultra-liberals to the
restrained presentation of widely respected
George Sokolsky in Hearst newspaper edi-
torial pages during the month of October,
1957.
Mr. Sokolsky focuses our attention upon
the problem by submitting that Representa-
tive Wright Patman of Texas has raised a
pertinent question concerning the Supreme
Court's use, as the basis of a holding, ma-
terial selected by the justices themselves
or by their law clerks and not submitted
to it by either party. Patman is quoted di-
rectly as saying:
4 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
o Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n. 11
(1954).
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Formerly, we had every reason to expect
that decisions by our Supreme Court would
be controlled by the standards outlined by
the Constitution, the law, the facts of the
case and by the sound reasoning of the jus-
tices. In the past even though we felt the
court had decided a ease wrongly, we never-
theless felt that we could understand that
the court had a basis in the record of the
hearing in the case for its decision ...
Moving to a conclusion on the issue
raised, Sokolsky suggests that "the problem
is not so much what material the justices
employ to form their opinions as that coun-
sel should know what it is so that they may
argue a point." When the issue is spotlighted
in such fashion it seems to justify some
analysis. That will be the purpose of this
article.
Certainly the Supreme Court has often
taken judicial notice of non-legal material
incorporated into appellate briefs. The
Court was first exposed to this approach
when Louis Brandeis appeared in 1908 as
counsel in Muller v. OregonT and argued
in support of regulating hours of work for
women. He incorporated into his brief
pertinent statistical data, scientific discus-
sion by persons of eminence in their profes-
sion, and departmental reports.
The Supreme Court's response to this
first use of the technique, which is today
familiarly known as the Brandeis brief, is
clearly manifest in this excerpt from the
Muller opinion:
The legislation and opinions referred to in
the margin may not be, technically speaking,
authorities, and in them is little or no dis-
cussion of the constitutional question pre-
sented to us for determination, yet they are
significant of a widespread belief that wo-
man's physical structure, and the functions
she performs in consequence thereof, jus-
tify special legislation restricting or qualify-
ing the conditions under which she should
7 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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be permitted to toil. Constitutional ques-
tions, it is true, are not settled by even a
consensus of present public opinion, for it
is the peculiar value of a written constitu-
tion that it places in unchanging form limita-
tions upon legislative action.... At the same
time, when a question of fact is debated and
debatable, and the extent to which a special
constitutional limitation goes is affected by
the truth in respect to that fact, a widespread
and long continued belief concerning it is
worthy of consideration. We take judicial
cognizance of all matters of general knowl-
edge.8
The Supreme Court's acceptance of a
Brandeis brief has never met with uniform
approval. Some attorneys object that it has
a drawback of affording no opportunity
for testing trustworthiness by the usual
methods available in connection with evi-
dence offered at the trial. This becomes
particularly vital to attorneys who perceive
the effectiveness of modern propaganda
techniques. The lay opposition to a Bran-
deis-brief approach is often grounded upon
belief that the judge is not significantly
qualified to pass upon underlying questions
of fact. Other laymen are willing to ac-
knowledge the judge's competence to decide
a pure question of law but are somewhat
reluctant to go along with a holding which
involves taking a position between two con-
flicting points of view in such fields as
economics, sociology or psychology.
Even greater numbers of attorneys and
laymen oppose the reliance of the Supreme
Court upon non-legal materials which are
not cited in the appellate briefs. The Bran-
deis brief at least gives the opponent indi-
cation of material presented to the Court
so that an effort could be made to rebut.
The questions raised by those who chal-
lenge the weight which the Court has
placed upon non-legal materials which
s Id. at 420-21.
come to its attention in a Brandeis brief or
which it may have discovered through its
own research warrant mature thought.
An analysis suggests a need first to recog-
nize that many phrases in the United States
Constitution are not expressed in terms of
mathematical dimensions but are state-
ments which gain meaning in the light of
developments in such fields as science and
social science. Benjamin Cardozo said that
"the great generalities of the Constitution
have a content and a significance that vary
from age to age." Chief Justice Hughes,
in his majority opinion in Home Building
& Loan Association v. Blaisdell,' stressed
that the interpretation of the great clauses
of the Constitution must not be confined
to the interpretation which the framers, with
the conditions and outlook of their time,
would have placed upon them. He said:
It was to guard against such a narrow con-
ception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered
the memorable warning -"We must never
forget that it is a Constitution we are ex-
pounding, a Constitution intended to endure
for ages to come, and, consequently, be
adapted to the various crises of human
affairs." . . . The case before us must be
considered in the light of our whole experi-
ence and not merely in that of what was
said a hundred years ago."
This assumption suggests the propriety
of a court welcoming evidence uncovered
through research in fields of learning other
than law. Cardozo makes the point clear
when he states in his "Nature of Judicial
Process" that:
Courts know today that statutes are to be
viewed, not in isolation or in vacuo, as pro-
nouncements of abstract principles for the
guidance of an ideal community, but in the
9 HALL, SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAM IN NATHAN
CARDOZO 111 (1947).
10 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
11 Id, at 443,
setting and framework of present-day con-
ditions, as revealed by the labors of econo-
mists and students of the social sciences in
our own country and abroad. 12
This philosophy fully explains, for ex-
ample, a court's desire for medical and soci-
ological evidence bearing upon individual
health in a contest raising the issue of
state infringement of the right to contract
and of the due process clause of the United
States Constitution by reason of legislation
restricting hours of work. A wish for psy-
chological and sociological evidence would
seem to be just as reasonable when an issue
of the equal protection of the laws under
the fourteenth amendment is raised by
state legislation requiring separate educa-
tional facilities for members of the negro
race.
This admission, however, leaves unre-
solved the correctness of an appellate
court's reliance upon facts in a Brandeis
brief which have not been tested under the
careful procedures of a trial. Also unre-
solved is the appropriateness of the court
basing a decision upon non-legal facts
which its own research has discovered.
The position of this writer is that the
Supreme Court should not turn its back
on a Brandeis brief and that the Court
itself can appropriately do research on non-
legal materials and, if the findings are
pertinent, rely upon them in making a deci-
sion. To conclude otherwise would seem to
make the Court susceptible to the criticism
which Cardozo aims at the jurists who con-
ceive their task to be nothing more than "...
to match the colors of the case at hand
against the colors of many sample cases
spread out upon their desk."'13
This attitude, however, is qualified by the
opinion that, if the Supreme Court discovers
12 HALL, Op. cit. supra note 9, at 139.
13 HALL, op. cit. supra note 9, at 113.
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non-legal materials which it feels bear upon
a constitutional issue involved in a case,
it should order reargument before it to
allow counsel to undertake refutation and
marshal non-legal materials in rebuttal.
Presumably there would not be the same
need to command reargument if non-legal
materials were introduced by a Brandeis
brief since opponents would be alerted and
could meet the materials in their briefs
and arguments. It does not seem necessary
to send the case back to a trial court for
jury consideration. Reargument before the
Supreme Court should be sufficient when
the Court has drawn upon non-legal sources
to help it decide the meaning of a constitu-
tional phrase. Adequate time should, of
course, be allowed for the preparation of
material to meet an argument in a Brandeis
brief or to meet non-legal data which Court
research has uncovered. The time for oral
argument should be extended to permit an
adequate presentation of a position in re-
spect to non-legal research. This seems nec-
essary in order to insure that the Court will
be fully enlightened about fields of knowl-
edge outside the law.
If the suggested precautions in respect to
reargumnent are taken, the justices will be
educated ". . . in the humanities and in
social sciences . . . [and will be in] posses-
sion of data, statistics, and surveys which
illuminated shadowy areas of the law." 14
There is a discernible difference between
situations of the type where the issue is
whether A promised to pay B or whether
automobile driver X failed to pull to a halt
at a stop light and hit Y, and the interpreta-
tion of the application of clauses like the
14 This is a phrase used by Justice William Douglas
of the United States Supreme Court to describe the
ability of the late Judge Jerome Frank of the Court
of Appeals of the Second Circuit. See Douglas,
Jerome N. Frank, 10 J. LEOAL ED. 1, 6 (1957).
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due process or equal protection statements
found in the United States Constitution.
There is obviously great need in contract
and tort situations to determine the credi-
bility of witnesses. For this purpose cross-
examination and the reaction of a jury are
most appropriate. If, on the other hand,
non-legal materials are introduced to help
with a decision on the due process and
.equal protection of the laws clause, the
responsible justice seems sufficiently, well
qualified to test credibility. In many in-
stances the non-legal material will have
been prepared by parties whose professional
reputation can be readily ascertained. Basic
honesty can be rather quickly verified
from public or semi-public sources. If, of
course, the justices should, in an unusual
situation, have serious doubts which can-
not be resolved, the matter can be sent
back to the trial court..
Even though the justices may be satis-
fied as to basic honesty, there may' remain
the question as to the validity of the scien-
tific or professional technique which has
been used by the one or several who have
prepared a study or report in the science
or social science areas. If reargument is
permitted, the opposition will have the
chance to marshal sources which would
raise such questions for judicial considera-
tion. This type of issue is one which can
be better resolved by a court than a jury.
Certainly the average jury would not be
particularly well equipped to decide the
scientific validity of techniques employed
by researchers in the field of science and
the social sciences.
Furthermore it appears that the type of
non-legal evidence which would be intro-
duced as bearing upon a substantive due
process or equal protection of the laws
qu6stion would frequently raise a debatable
issue because various studies may end in
different ultimate conclusions. Since, how-
ever, the Court is trying to decide an issue
of law - the meaning of due process or
equal protection of the laws clause - it has
the right and the need to take an attitude
toward the debatable issue and decide the
constitutional question. It is not a matter
for jury decision. The meaning of the Con-
stitution is not decided upon the vote of a
jury.
The Supreme Court is perfectly familiar
with handling debatable issues. In connec-
tion with state regulation of business, the
Court has frequently been introduced to
non-legal materials. In resolving -debatable
issues which arise in the business-economics
area, the Court, since the late thirties, has
mostly ruled in favor of state police power.
Justice Douglas in 1952 pointed out that,
if recent cases mean anything, they
leave debatable issues, such as respect busi-
ness and economics, to legislative deci-
sion.15 This, of course, is because the Court,
in the weighing process, is not impressed
with the plea that contract and property
rights should be looked upon as more im-
portant than the state's interest in such
things as health, safety, morals or the gen-
eral welfare. As long as the issue was de-
batable, the Court was willing to take the
word of the legislature for the need to pro-
tect health, safety, morals or general wel-
fare.
We do not, of course, know exactly what
the Court would have done if it had ordered
reargument on non-legal materials in the
Brown v. Board of Education16 controversy
and had, as a result, been confronted with
a debatable issue. It is most likely that
15 See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342
U.S. 421, 425 (1952).
16 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
the ultimate decision would have been the
same as rendered in 1954. In the weighing
effort, a consciousness that all human beings
have a natural due process right not to be
treated as inferior would undoubtedly have
served as a most adequate reason for the
Court to conclude that, as long as there
were reputable materials indicating the psy-
chological effect of segregation, the state
law should be condemned as violative of
equal protection of the laws clause. This
would furnish the justification for over-
ruling the "separate but equal doctrine" of
Plessy v. Ferguson."
The use by the Court of non-legal mate-
rials, forcing as it often will the need to react
to debatable issues, requires more than ever
before that we have justices who are guided
by principles of sound philosophy and a
recognition of natural law.
This additional responsibility should
most certainly not induce non-use of non-
legal knowledge. The Court ought not turn
away from non-legal sources of information
because, in passing upon a constitutional
question, it is not merely deciding a narrow
issue between two parties. It is giving life
to a clause in the Constitution. What the
Court says will often have an impact on
hundreds of thousands. Therefore, the
Court should not penalize those thousands
because the trial or appellate counsel may
not have had the vision to see the value
of non-legal research.
The rights of interested parties will be
protected if reargument is allowed. Reargu-
ment needs to be ordered when counsel at
the appellate level have not had time to
study and reply to non-legal information
which the Court feels bears upon the con-
troversy. No lack of skill should be imputed
to counsel for failure to anticipate the non-
17 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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legal knowledge which the Court may find
through its own research. A lawyer may be
held responsible for not finding pertinent
legal citations and studies, but it seems
somewhat unrealistic to hold him account-
able for failure to anticipate all research
findings which may be used in deciding a
problem at the appellate level.
The Constitution should be permitted to
grow under the interpretation of a Supreme
Court educated on all knowledge appli-
cable to the problem of interpreting such
great phrases as "due process" and "equal
protection of the laws."
It seems obvious that the Court should
not attempt to side-step controversy in the
ordering of reargument by the practice of
refraining from citing non-legal materials.
It would appear that the right-minded jus-
tice would want to make sure that his edu-
cation in pertinent non-legal areas was
well-rounded. Furthermore, if the Court
follows the procedure suggested, it will
impress the public with its philosophy of
complete fairness. Most certainly courts of
justice should be acutely conscious of the
value of creating such impression.
The Court has every right to enlighten
itself on non-legal facts and to ask counsel
for further help in all relevant non-legal
fields. As Justice Walter Schaefer of the
Illinois Supreme Court pointed out in com-
menting upon a phase of the effort of a re-
viewing court, an appellate tribunal, in
addition to being interested in the views
of the legal profession as expressed formally
in court decisions, treatises, and law re-
views, should also desire the opinion of any
informed group. "Witness, for example,"
he says, "the impact of the views of psy-
chiatrists on the tests for determining sanity
in criminal cases as announced in McNagh-
ten's [sic] case."
